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How DOES THE EUROPEAN UNION SOLVE CRISES-WITH SOLUTIONS
OR BY AVOIDANCE? A STUDY OF THE "MAD Cow DISEASE" CRISIS
Salmeh K. Fodor*
The European Union, an intergovernmental entity composed of fifteen
European countries, postpones and avoids the resolution of crises rather than
implements effective solutions. Highlighting this inability to resolve
problems is the manner in which the institutions of the European Union (EU)
dealt with the "mad cow disease" crisis. These institutions failed not only
to prevent the crisis, but also failed to provide a solution. Specifically,
violating treaty directives, the European Commission allowed political
influence to direct its actions regarding the implementation of EU directives,
and the European Parliament failed to exercise its supervisory power to
sanction the Commission for its nonfeasance with treaty mandates.'
One reason the countries of Europe enacted treaties to create the EU
(treaties) was to provide an intergovernmental entity to solve problems that
they could not effectively handle on the national level.2 In creating this
entity, the countries of Europe (Member States) were concerned not only
with partial relinquishment of power, but also with the possible misuse of
power by the EU.3 Therefore, to assuage these fears, the treaties include a
carefully devised structure of five primary institutions, each with separate
and limited powers.4 The five institutions include Parliament, Council,
Commission, Court of Justice and Court of Auditors.5 The design of this
structure dejure ensures a balance of power and effective interstate problem
solving.6
* J.D. 1998, University of Georgia.
'See European Parliament Temporary Committee of Inquiry into BSE, Part III of Part A
of the Draft Report, Dec. 19, 1996, <http:llwww.europarl.eu.int/dgl/a4/en/a4-97/a4-0020.htm>
(last visited Sept. 24, 1998). From the author's personal interview with Elena Rivera of the
European Union Delegation, the best place to access this unpublished work is through the
European Union Home page which is monitored and updated daily by representatives of the
European Union. [Hereinafter TCI Report].
2 See HANS A. SCHMITT, THE PATH TO EUROPEAN UNION 88 (1962).
3 P.D. DAGTOGLOU, BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IX-X (1975).
4 RICHARD CORBETr, THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT (1993).
5 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 4, 31 I.L.M. 247, 258 [hereinafter
MAASTRICHT TREATY].
6 See id.; see also SCHMITT, supra note 2, at 87.
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The structural balance of power is especially notable in the responsibilities
assigned to the Commission and Parliament. Theoretically, the Commission
is a politically independent body whose primary function is to act as
guardian of the treaties by ensuring that the fifteen Member States comply
with EU mandates.7 On the other hand, Parliament, as the only populous
body, is entrusted with the responsibility of supervising the activities of the
Commission.' If the Commission is deemed to have failed to fulfill its
responsibilities under the treaties, Parliament is authorized to sanction the
Commission. 9 This supervisory role was granted to Parliament to limit the
Commission's possible misuse of authority.'"
The separate but limited powers granted to the Commission and Parlia-
ment create a natural tension. The recent global panic regarding the spread
of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or mad cow disease) has
highlighted this tension." BSE was first discovered in British cows in
1986 and has since been detected in hundreds and thousands of their
cows. 12 Although a link to the human counterpart of BSE, Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease (CJD), cannot be definitively proved, the possibility of such
a connection can not be ignored: it is thought to be the cause of at least ten
deadly cases of an abnormal form of CJD.' 3 The evidence of a connection
is so strong that many countries, including the United States and some
members of the European Community, have instituted bans on British beef
and beef by-products. 4
7 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 295
U.N.T.S. 103 [hereinafter EEC TREATY] art. 155. MAASTRICHT TREATY art. 157(2), supra
note 5.
8 See EEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 143 and 147.
9 EEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 144.
10 See SCHMIrT, supra note 2, at 128.
" See TCI Report, supra note 1.
12 Neal Nathanson et al., BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE): CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF A COMMON SOURCE EPIDEMIC, 145 AM. J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 959, 959-69
n.11 (1997).
'3 Claire O'Brien, Protein Test Favors BSE-CJD Link, 274 SCIENCE MAG., Nov. 1, 1996,
at 721. Unlike the normal form of CJD which normally afflicts the elderly, the abnormal
strain of the disease afflicts people under the age of forty five and results in an unusual
pattern of brain damage that is different from the pattern found in victims of normal CJD.
Id.
14 Sarah Boseley, How the Truth was Butchered, 43 WORLD PRESS REV., June 1996, at
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These bans on British beef and beef by-products are signs of the
impending European, and eventually global, crises. The EU was, in part,
created to prevent such situations. If the problem was acknowledged in the
1980's, the question remains why the EU failed to provide an effective
solution to the dilemma and thereby permitted the BSE affair to develop into
a global crises? As a result, the EU has desperately been trying to answer
this question and solve the crisis. In an effort to provide a solution,
Parliament established a Temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate the
situation.' 5 Although this investigation resulted in the TCI placing consid-
erable blame on one of its Member States, the United Kingdom (UK), the
TCI also severely criticized the role of the Commission in the affair. 6
Parliament adopted the findings and recommendations of the TCI and, in
light of the results of this investigation and seriousness of the BSE crisis,
voted on a motion to censure the Commission for its mismanagement of the
crises.17 In February of 1997, Parliament voted on, but ultimately rejected,
the motion.' Instead, a conditional censure was placed on the Commission
whereby if the Commission failed to promptly abide by the recommendations
set forth in the TCI report, a motion of censure would be brought later in
1997.'9
A closer examination of the results of the TCI report combined with
Parliament's failure to exercise its power of censure against the Commission
for its nonfeasance with treaty directives reveals the EU's inability to
effectively solve problems. The report reveals the most significant
impediment to the EU's ability to solve problems: the fact that the Commis-
sion is dejure limited in its use of power by the threat of a censure but is
defacto able to exercise considerable power and follow the will of the
current, most politically influential Member State. The ability of certain
Member States to exert significant political influence on an institution
entrusted with executive duties combined with the lack of effective
supervision or limits on that institution's power results in the EU merely
postponing and avoiding crises rather than providing effective solutions.
Recently, the European Community has been in an uproar regarding the
'5 TCI report, supra note 1.
16 Id.
17 EU: EP/Mad Cow - the Implementation of Commission Resolution, AGENCE EUR., Feb.
20, 1997 [hereinafter EP/Mad Cow].
18 Id.
'9 Id. Also referred to as a "suspended" censure.
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Commission's handling of the BSE crisis. The deadly BSE was first
diagnosed in British cattle in the mid-1980's. 20 For almost a decade after
this discovery, the British government adamantly denied that the presence of
the disease required mass herd slaughters and that the disease could be
transmitted to humans.2' Nevertheless, in the late 1980's, the danger to
herds of cattle around the world combined with the growing possibility of
a link between BSE and the deadly CJD disease induced many countries,
including the United States, to effect a ban on the importation of British beef
and beef by-products.22
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, the EU was not willing to follow suit
by effecting such a ban.23 On the other hand, in an extraordinary meeting
of the Council in June of 1990, the Council officially recognized the
potential economic and health hazards posed by the spread of BSE.24 As
a result, the Council issued directives requiring Britain to comply with a
number of safety measures in order to prevent the spread of, and ultimately
eradicate, the disease.25 Additionally, the Council mandated that the
Commission implement research programs and ensure the UK's compliance
with EU directives.26
On March 20, 1996, the British government officially recognized the
probable link between BSE and the deadly CJD disease.27 In light of the
previous official denial of any possible link, this acknowledgment sent a
wave of shock across Europe and the world. Within a week, many countries,
including most European countries, banned British beef and beef by-
products.28 This ban marked the end, although temporarily, of a beef and
beef by-products trade relationship which had represented millions of dollars
for the UK.29
20 Nathanson, supra note 12.
21 D. Arcy Jenish, A Disturbing Link to the 'Mad Cow' Disease, 109 MACLEAN'S, Apr.
1, 1996, at 36.
22 Id.
23 TCI Report, supra note 1.
24 Id.
25 id.
26 id.
27 Peter Blackburn, EU Parliament Warns Brussels Over BSE, REUTER EUR. Bus. REP.,
Feb. 18, 1997.
28 Id. at 1. See also Jenish, supra note 21, at 36. Such countries as South Africa, Zaire,
New Zealand and Singapore immediately stopped imports of British beef. Id.
9 TCI Report, supra note 1.
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The EU also reacted swiftly to the British government's acknowledgement
of the probable link between BSE and the deadly CJO disease. On March
27, 1996, the Commission adopted a resolution imposing a worldwide ban
on the export of British beef and beef by-products.30 This decision further
imposed a duty upon the Commission to conduct inspections in Great Britain
to ensure that measures were implemented to solve the problem.3' Soon
after, the Commission adopted another resolution whereby it imposed a
"compulsory slaughter of animals identified as imported from the United
Kingdom, all animals in herds where. cases of BSE have occurred and all
animals in other herds identified as belonging to the same birth cohort as
affected animals. 32
Even with these new measures, some began to question why the BSE
situation reached the point of a crisis in the first place. Many Member States
expressed concern that the crisis might have been the result not only of
British misconduct but also of misconduct on the part of the Commission.3
In response to the concerns, Parliament, in July of 1996, established a
Temporary Committee of Inquiry (TCI) to conduct an investigation into the
possible mishandling of the BSE affair and to suggest recommendations to
resolve the problem.34 The result of the investigation is a report in which
the TCI makes recommendations to improve the BSE situation, accuses the
Commission of mishandling the BSE situation, and denounces the conduct
of the UK.35 Specifically, the TCI charges the Commission with submitting
to the political influence exerted by the UK and of failing to implement the
directives set forth during the Council Meeting in June of 1990.36
As a result of this report and considerable pressure from many political
groups, Parliament, in February of 1997, voted on a motion to censure the
Commission.37  The motion fell short of the required votes and was
rejected.3 s However, in an attempt to implement a solution to the crisis,
Parliament formally adopted the findings and suggestions of the TCI's report.
30 Commission Decision 96/362, 1996 O.J. (L 078).
3 id.
32 Commission Decision 96/381, 1996 O.J. (L 149) 25.
33 Blackburn, supra note 27, at 1.
34 MAAsTRIcHT TREATY art. 138c, supra note 5. Blackburn, supra note 27. See TCI
Report, supra note 1.
35 TCI Report, supra note 1.
36 Id.
37 id.
38 EP/Mad Cow, supra note 17.
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Additionally, a resolution was adopted which places a suspended censure on
the Commission for mishandling the mad cow disease situation.39 This
decision serves as a threat to the Commission that failure to comply with the
recommendations set forth in the TCI report, will result in another motion
to censure4
The EU was, in part, established to help solve multi-state problems that
could not be effectively handled on the national level.4 ' In creating this
entity, Member States were concerned with relinquishing too much power
and were also fearful of any one institution within the EU gaining too much
control over international affairs.42 Therefore, to assuage the fears of
Member States and effectively fulfill the resolutions under the treaties, the
EU is divided into five institutions including Parliament, Commission,
Council, Court of Justice and Court of Auditors. 3 Additionally, each
institution has different responsibilities and authority under the treaties. The
result is a system structurally designed so that no one institution has the
ability to misuse its power. For example, the Commission was entrusted
with considerable executory and supervisory authority, but Parliament has the
responsibility of censuring the Commission if the Commission abused its
power.44
Motions to censure the Commission have been raised as early as 1972. 45
However, between 1972 and 1992, only seven motions to censure the
Commission have been formally presented in Parliament.46 Partly due to
the seriousness of the act and in part due to its grave consequences, not a
single motion to censure has ever been adopted by Parliament.47 Addition-
ally, most motions were withdrawn before a vote could be conducted. 8 The
seriousness of this act is revealed by the fact that if a censure is endorsed by
Parliament, the Commission must resign as a body.49 Furthermore, neither
national governments nor the Council have the power to censure the
39 Id.
4 Id.
41 CORBETT, supra note 4, at 9-10.
42 Id. SCHMITT, supra note 2.
41 See id.
44 CORBETI, supra note 4.
45 FRANCIS JACOBS ET AL., THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2d ed. 1992).
6 id.
47 Id.
4 Id.
49 EEC TREATY art. 144, supra note 7.
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Commission; the power rests squarely on the shoulders of the populous
Parliament.5
The responsibility of censuring the Commission for nonfeasance with
treaty directives is clearly stated in the treaties, but the power dates back
almost to the origins of Parliament.51 A "real" parliament first arose with
the Schuman Plan and the ensuing European Coal and Steel Community.52
At the heart of the Schuman Plan was the ideal of "[i]ntegration entrusted to
a control organ independent of national supervision. 53  The Plan estab-
lished a Common Assembly, now called Parliament, which had limited
responsibilities, but was granted a degree of control over the High Authori-
ty. 4 In contrast, the High Authority, now called the Commission, was
empowered with extensive responsibilities.55 The Assembly's alleged
control over the High Authority rested with the Assembly's power to force
the resignation of the High Authority by a successful motion of censure.56
Today, as in the past, Parliament has relatively limited responsibilities and
authority, while the Commission enjoys extensive supervisory and executive
responsibilities. 57  However, one of Parliament's most important duties is
to supervise the activities of the Commission. 5  This duty theoretically
serves the purpose of preventing the Commission from abusing its powers.59
In contrast to Parliament's responsibilities, one of the Commission's
So JACOBS, supra note 45. CORBETT, supra note 4.
51 SCHMITr, supra note 2.
52 Id. DAGTOGLOU, supra note 3. RATIFICATION OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY (Finn
Laursen & Sophie Vanhoonacker eds., 1994). In 1949 at the Congress at The Hague, the first
parliament of Europe was formed and was named the Advisory Assembly. SCHMITT, supra
note 2. This Assembly was different from any succeeding parliament in that it had very few
responsibilities and no power over its sister institution, the Council of Ministers. Id. The
Assembly became "merely a 'simulacrum of a European parliament and not the real thing.'
Id. at 66.
53 SCHMITT, supra note 2, at 67. Jean Monnet was the person responsible for developing
the Schuman Plan; Schuman merely accepted responsibility for the plan for political reasons.
Id. The ideal at the heart of the Schuman Plan was therefore the same ideal envisioned by
Jean Monnet. Id.
54 id.
55 id.
56 id.
"' MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 5, arts. 157 and 158.
58 MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 5, art. 144.
59 See SCHMITT, supra note 2. See JACOBS, supra note 45. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
153 (Geoffrey Edwards & David Spence eds., 1994).
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primary duties is to serve as guardian of the treaties: the Commission is
entrusted with "ensure[ing] that the provisions of... [the treaties] and the
measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied. '60 Further-
more, the treaties direct the Commission to "exercise the powers conferred
on it by the Council for the implementation of the rules laid down by the
latter.",6' The differences in responsibilities and powers between Parliament
and the Commission provide an important balance of power to ensure that
one institution would not become too powerful.62
Additionally, Member States have incorporated into the treaties other
provisions which help to ensure a balance of power within the EU. For
example, the method of selecting the members of each institution is
considerably different. Parliament is the only European institution that is
elected by direct universal suffrage.63 In contrast, the Commission is not
an elected body. The Commissioners are nominated by the governments of
Member States and are approved as a body by Parliament.64 Furthermore,
the treaties require the complete political independence of the Commission,
whereas the members of Parliament enjoy the ability to form political
affinities.65 Finally, with regard to the power of censure, the treaties allow
Parliament to censure the Commission, but do not permit the Commission
to censure the Parliament.66 In part, these differences in power were
calculated to assuage the fears of some Member States that one State or
institution would garner too much power.67
The authority entrusted to Parliament and the Commission was granted
only after considerable debate among European countries. In creating the
EU, Member States agreed to relinquish a degree of autonomy in order to
create an entity which could solve interstate crises. 68 With this relinquish-
ment of some autonomy, there were concerns regarding the manner in which
60 EEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 155.
61 id.
62 See SCHMrIT, supra note 2. See JACOBS, supra note 45. See THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, supra note 59.
63 EEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 138.
64 MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 5, art 158.
65 MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 5, art. 138(a) and 157.
66 See EEC TREATY, supra note 7.
67 See SCHMITT, supra note 2. See DAGTOGLOU, supra note 3.
68 See SCHMITT, supra note 2. The EU was also created to eventually achieve a common
market. Id.
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the power entrusted to the EU might be divided among its institutions. 9
In particular, some Member States were disturbed by the extensive general
powers granted to the Commission.7" Similarly, other Member States were
concerned about the limitations exacted upon the Parliament.7' Such
reservations have persisted over the years. 72 Even today there continues to
be much debate over what powers the Commission should enjoy and what
powers should be relinquished to Parliament.
73
The BSE crisis compels the re-examination of the nature of the institutions
of the EU and the effectiveness of the EU in solving crises. The treaties
theoretically establish a balanced system designed to solve intergovernmental
problems.74 In reality, the EU does not solve intergovernmental crises, but
instead postpones and avoids such dilemmas. This ineffectiveness is
revealed by the Commission's failure to implement the Council's mandates
regarding the BSE crisis combined with the failure of Parliament to censure
the Commission for its nonfeasance.75
The Commission's mishandling of the BSE crisis is evidenced by the TCI
report which summarizes the results of an extensive investigation into the
situation.76 The results support earlier accusations that the Commission
acted pursuant to the politically motivated direction of the UK and placed the
British beef market ahead of human health and safety.77 Such actions by
the Commission are a violation of Article 157 of the treaty which requires
the Commission to "neither seek nor take instructions" from any body
including Member States. 78 Furthermore, such actions are also a violation
of Article 100(a) of the treaty which requires the Commission to "take as a
base a high level of protection" in the areas of health and safety as well as
environmental and consumer protection.79
69 1d.
70 Id.
71 SCHMrIT, supra note 2, at 77-88. France and Germany were especially concerned with
the balance of powers in the new community. Id. On the other hand, such concern might
well have been a result of their mistrust for each other during the 1940's and 1950's. Id.
72 See JACOBS, supra note 45.
73 id.
74 See THE RATIFICATION OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 52. See CORBETT,
supra note 4.
75 TCI Report, supra note 1. EP/Mad Cow, supra note 17.
76 TCI Report, supra note 1.
n Id.
78 EEC TREATY art. 157(2), supra note 7.
79 EEC TREATY art. 100a(3), supra note 7.
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The TCI asserts that the Commission submitted to the political influence
of the UK."0 This influence is revealed by the excessive reliance on the
instructions given by successive Commissioners of Agriculture."1 In
particular, the TCI determined that "the Commission's management of the
BSE affair has at all points been based on the direct instructions" of these
Commissioners. 2 Had* the instructions been politically unbiased, there may
not have been an issue regarding the Commission's excessive reliance on
particular Commissioners. But, the fact remains that the directions were
biased. Through official testimony and documents, the TCI discovered that
successive Agricultural Commissioners favored the British beef export
industry over the potential human danger posed by the transmission of
BSE."3
For example, such bias is revealed through the actions taken by Agricul-
tural Commissioner, Mr. MacSharry, before the Council Meeting of June
1990 (Council Meeting). It was during this meeting that the initial
regulations were placed on British beef processing and exportation in an
effort to curb the spread of BSE.' In the days preceding the Council
Meeting, Mr. MacSharry made "public threats to take out infringement
proceedings against Member States introducing unilateral measures against
British beef exports, or even to take such Member States to the Court of
Justice."8 5 An additional example reflecting Mr. MacSharry's bias was his
response to an actual proposal set forth during the Council Meeting. During
the meeting, the Assistant Director-General for Agriculture, along with two
other officials, submitted a proposal to Mr. MacSharry which recommended
British beef be exported only in de-boned form due to the difficulties in
monitoring beef exports.8 6 Mr. MacSharry's response was so harsh that
those submitting the proposal were excluded from the meeting room and
were no longer given the opportunity to discuss the proposal.8 7 Both of
these actions suggest that Mr. MacSharry favored the British beef export
industry over health and safety.
go TCI Report, supra note 1.
s Id. at 18.
82 id.
13 See id.
8 See id.
85 Id. at 10.
86 TCI REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
87 id.
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In further support of the Commission's submission to the political
influence exerted by the UK is the Commission's excessive reliance on the
Scientific Veterinary Committee, SVC.88 This reliance, in and of itself,
may not have been an issue of misfeasance, except for the fact that the SVC
is primarily composed of British officials.8 9 Beyond those measures
recommended by the SVC, the Commission did not exert any further effort
to devise public health measures.9° "[T]he Commission, using its own
scientific and risk assessment capacities, should have embarked on a detailed
and critical examination. . ." of the BSE situation.9'
Additionally, the success of British officials in influencing the SVC is
revealed by the circumstances surrounding the lifting of the EU's embargo
on semen, tallow and gelatin.92 In April of 1996 the SVC considered the
possibility of ending the ban, but the proposal was not approved due to the
opposition of the Scientific Committee on Cosmetology, the Scientific
Committee for Food, and the European Medicine Evaluation Agency.
93
Nevertheless, the Commission "insisted on trying to obtain a report in favor
of lifting the embargo . . . ."94 The desired report was soon acquired, and
even though most scientific studies opposed the action, the ban was lifted.95
The problem with this report was that it was not only based on experiments
involving scrapie instead of BSE, but was also "provisional, incomplete and
therefore [of a] dubiously reliable nature. 96
In addition to finding that the Commission submitted to the political
influence of the UK, the TCI stated that the Commission failed to implement
the directives issued during the extraordinary Council Meeting in June of
1990. 9' Specifically, these directives require the development of large-scale
research programs, implementation of decisions regarding BSE, and on-site
inspections. 98 Between 1990 and 1994, no large-scale research programs
were instituted; instead the Commission fashioned a deliberate political
8 Id.
89 See id.
90 Id.
9, Id. at 17.
92 See id.
9' Id. at 17.
94 id.
9' See id.
96 Id. at 18.
97 id.
98 Id.
1998]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
policy of "subordinat[ing] Community to British research."" This policy
is confirmed by official testimony and a Commission document stating that
" 'Community action would therefore be designed to complement the UK
research....' ""
Furthermore, in contrast to the Council's mandate to implement decisions
to improve the BSE situation, there was a "silence which ... cannot be
considered accidental."'' The Commission waited six years after the
Council directive to ban UK exports of meat and bone-meal.'0 2 Under the
circumstances, "this is particularly grave: more timely action could arguably
have stopped the spread of the epidemic in Europe..."'03
Additionally, between June 1990 and May 1994, the Commission failed
to conduct regular inspections in the UK."°  With regard to these inspec-
tions, the Commission admitted that it was subject to considerable political
pressure exerted by the UK.105 Specifically, the UK pressured the Com-
mission to omit BSE checks from general slaughterhouse inspections.' 6
Furthermore, there was at least one situation where negative results from an
inspection were not directed to the proper authorities.'07
The Commission's submission to British political influence as well as the
failure of the Commission to implement EU directives are extensively
documented in the TCI report. 10s Furthermore, the report also indicates
that had the Commission fulfilled its obligations under the treaties, the BSE
crises might have been prevented.' 9 The result of the BSE affair is a
worldwide panic concerning British beef which has resulted in the loss of
billions of dollars." 0 Furthermore, the possibility exists that tens and
99 Id. at 16.
IOD id.
o'0 Id. at 15.
102 id.
103 Id. at 16.
"o1 Id. at 13. Additionally, only thirty seven general inspections were conducted between
1990 and 1994. Id.
103 Id.
106 id.
107 Id. at 14.
'08 See id.
109 Id.
"0 Blackburn, supra note 27. Jenish, supra note 21. EU Stops Fiddling While Cows
Burn, 274 SCIENCE 1297. This money has either been spent or set aside to slaughter herds
of cattle and to implement extensive research programs to study BSE and related diseases.
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thousands more people are infected with CJD as a result of the BSE
epidemic."'
Parliament was privy to all of this information regarding the Commission's
role in the BSE affair before it voted on a motion to censure the Commission
in February of 1997.112 Nevertheless, despite the global nature of the
economic and human crisis, the motion was rejected.' This result
compels an examination of Parliament's willingness to exercise its superviso-
ry authority. If Parliament is unwilling to censure the Commission under
such egregious circumstances, then we must ask how devastating must a
crisis be before such measures are taken?
Although the treaties of the EU allocate to Parliament the power to
censure, the circumstances under which such an action may or should be
taken are not provided. 14  Furthermore, since not a single motion to
censure has ever been adopted by Parliament, there are no standards by
which to compare such a motion." 5 As a result, the decision of whether
or not to approve a motion to censure has been determined primarily by the
emotional speeches given during the Parliamentary debates." 6  These
debates have focused on issues that have relatively limited global repercus-
sions compared to the worldwide panic over the mad cow disease crisis.
Furthermore, these debates do not reflect the results of a well documented,
intensive investigation. 117
For example, during the debates on the motion to censure conducted in
1977, all the speakers in favor of the censure conceded that the motion was
basically political."' The issues discussed concerned various aspects of the
economics of alleged excessive accumulation of butter and milk powder.' 9
Nevertheless, the proponents admit that their concern was not strictly based
on the problems associated with the milk and butter stockpiles but with the
resulting potential imbalance of power within the EU. 20 Specifically, their
"' Boseley, supra note 14.
112 See Blackburn, supra note 27.
113 id.
"4 See EEC TREATY, supra note 7. See MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 4.
115 JACOBS ET AL., supra note 45, at 225.
116 See EUR. PARL. DEB. (215) 40 (March 23, 1977). See EUR. PARL. DEB. (407) 105
(July 8-9, 1991).
" See id.
"8 EUR. PARL. DEB. (215) 40 (March 23, 1977).
,I Id. at 41.
'2 Id. at 40.
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fear was that if Parliament "failed to discharge [its] responsibilities whenever
there was an infringement of the rules, [it] should no longer be a credible
institution in the eyes of the people [it] serves.'' Such political concerns
are troublesome, but are not well founded in the situation of milk and butter
stockpiles. Unlike the situation surrounding the BSE crisis, the situation
involving milk and butter stockpiles does not rise to a global level.
Additionally, the debates surrounding the dairy stockpiles fail to reflect either
the seriousness of the situation or the egregiousness of the Commission's
acts.
Another example of misplaced issues is the Parliamentary debates
regarding the motion to censure the Commission in 1992. These debates
concern the role of the Commission in the Yugoslavian conflict; another
situation with relatively limited global repercussions. 122 Some members
of Parliament charge the Commission with "fail[ing] to fulfill [its] role which
was to anticipate ... [that] Yugoslav unity would be cast into doubt."' 123
This accusation was not supported by testimony and documentation, nor do
the treaties state that the Commission has a duty to anticipate the break-up
of countries. 24 In contrast, during the BSE affair the proponents of the
censure had ample testimony and documentation to support their posi-
tion. 25 Additionally, during the BSE affair the Commission violated
article 155 of the treaties by submitting to the political influence of the
UK. 126  Furthermore, with regard to the BSE situation, the Commission
admitted it was at least partially at fault.'27 These differences not only
highlight the disparity in evidentiary support between the motions, but also
highlight the disparity in the scope of the problems.
In contrast to the subjects of the previous motions to censure, the most
recent motion involves a global crises. The extensive scope of this crisis is
evidenced by the number of countries around the world which have banned
the importation of British beef and beef by-products as well as the EU's
worldwide ban on the exportation of such commodities.1 28 Therefore, the
121 Id. at 40.
122 EUR. PARL. DEB. (407) 105 (July 8-9, 1991).
2 Id. at 106.
124 See EEC TREATY, supra note 7. See CORBETT, supra note 4.
'2 TCI Report, supra note 1.
"26 For the duty to remain politically independent see EEC TREATY, supra note 7. See
TCI Report, supra note 1 for the submission to UK political influence.
'2' TCI Report, supra note 1.
' Jenish, supra note 21. Blackburn, supra note 27.
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most recent motion to censure the Commission for its handling of the BSE
situation is vastly different from, and more serious than, any previous
motion. Nevertheless, Parliament refused to exercise its supervisory power
under the treaties and instead placed a suspended censure upon the
Commission. 29 Essentially, Parliament avoided and postponed the issue
of censure by rejecting the motion and promising to re-examine the issue in
the future. This decision shows Parliament's unwillingness to punish the
Commission for abusing its powers and its inability to prevent future abuse
by the Commission.
The result of the EU's handling of recent global crises reveals that in its
present form, the EU is not the effective body that was originally envisioned
by Member States. The EU's handling of the BES crisis illustrates the EU's
inability to provide solutions to multi-State problems. During the BSE affair,
the Commission, often considered the executive institution, was essentially
controlled by the political will of the U.K. As a result, the Commission
acted in a manner endangering the health and safety of the citizens of Europe
and the world. 30  Additionally, Parliament proved to be helpless in
punishing the Commission for its misconduct. The decision of Parliament
to place a "suspended" censure on the Commission merely left the BSE
crisis unresolved.
Overall, an analysis of the time line of events with regard to the BSE
crisis reveals that the EU engages in a cycle of avoiding and postponing the
resolution of problems. In 1990, the Council acknowledged the potential
global, economic and human danger posed by the disease and issued
directives to the UK and the Commission in an effort to prevent the problem
from turning into a crisis.' 3' Neither the UK nor the Commission, which
submitted to the influence of the UK, implemented those directives. 32 In
1996, the mad cow disease problem erupted into a global crisis.13 In
1997, Parliament failed to censure the Commission for mismanaging the
affair and violating treaty directives. Instead, Parliament issued a suspended
censure, an act which at best may be equated with a slap on the hand.
Additionally, Parliament issued more directives to be followed by the UK
and the Commission.
34
'2 Blackburn, supra note 27.
t30 TCI Report, supra note 1.
131 See id.
132 id.
133 Blackburn, supra note 27.
1' TCI Report, supra note 1.
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Parliament's action compels observers to ask why should the UK or the
Commission follow additional directives when they were not sanctioned
either for their deliberate failure to adhere to previous directives nor their
deliberate violation of EU treaties? The threat of a censure in the future is
not enough of a threat to compel the Commission to follow EU direc-
tives. 35 Since the power to censure the Commission has been in existence
since the very beginning of the EU, threatening the Commission with a
motion of censure in the future is not only redundant but, as history has
revealed, also ineffective. This threat is always imminent, but it is not a
threat likely to come to fruition.
3 6
As revealed by the BSE crises, the Commission acts in a manner reflecting
no fear of being sanctioned. Even more potentially dangerous than a
Commission without fear of reprimand is a Commission free to choose
political sides to the detriment of the rest of the Member States. With
Parliament's unwillingness to censure the Commission even in the most
egregious of circumstances, the EU is unable to provide effective solutions
to interstate solutions. The world's faith in the EU's future as a globally
powerful entity will rapidly decline if it can not quickly and effectively
provide solutions to situations such as the BSE crisis.
135 See SCHMITr, supra note 2.
236 See id
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